


Detecting Anomalies

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Cause-Effect Chains





Observer sees failure



Where to search?

We can easily isolate *infectuous data* (automatically) . . .

- Tracing Origins
- Cause-Effect Chains
- ... and we can isolate the infections themselves (manually)
 - Querying Events and Data
 - Assertions

But where do we start with the search?



Basic idea:

Start search where something *abnormal* happens!

How do we know what's normal and what's abnormal? We use *induction*—reasoning from the particular to the general:

- Start with a *multitude* of program runs (= testcases).
- Determine properties that are *common* to all (or most) runs.



What's abnormal?

Suppose we have a multitude of *passing* runs and determine their normal properties.

Now we examine runs which *fail* the test.

Obviously, any such run differs from a single passing run at many places—just like any two runs differ.

However, focusing on the properties that deviate from *all* normal runs is likely to show failure causes.





Detecting Anomalies in a Nutshell

- 1. Separate runs into passing and failing
- 2. Determine *normal* properties of all passing runs.
- 3. For any failing run, find out which properties *deviate* from these normal properties.
- 4. Focus on these in the later search.

We'll explore two techniques:

- Detecting anomalies in *covered statements*
- Detecting anomalies in *invariants*





Detecting Coverage

Basic issue: A good test suite should execute all statements of the executed program.

(This is a *minimal criterion*; a better criterion would be to execute all branches, or all loops at least once, or...)

Realized by *instrumenting* the code.





Example: middle.c

```
// Return the middle of x, y, z
int middle(int x, int y, int z) {
    int m = z;
    if (y < z) {
       if (x < y)
           m = y;
       else if (x < z)
           m = y;
    } else {
        if (x > y)
            m = y;
        else if (x > z)
            m = x;
    return m;
```





Example: middle.c (2)

```
// Test driver
int main(int arc, char *argv[])
ł
    int x = atoi(argv[1]);
    int y = atoi(argv[2]);
    int z = atoi(argv[3]);
    int m = middle(x, y, z);
    printf("middle: %d\n", m);
    return 0;
}
$ gcc -o middle middle.c
$ \/middle 3 3 5
middle: 3
$ \/middle 2 1 3
middle: 1
$
```





Instrumenting middle.c

The compiler (GCC) can insert special *instrumentation code* into the executable:

\$ gcc -g -fprofile-arcs -ftest-coverage -o middle \
 middle.c

This results in

- extra .bb and .bbg files created at compile time. These files map basic blocks and transition arcs to source code.
- extra . da files being created at execution. This file *summarizes* the coverage of transition arcs in *all* runs.

Instrumenting middle.c (2)

Executing middle summarizes the runs in a .da file:

```
$ rm *.da
$ 1s
middle middle.bb middle.bbg middle.c
$ ./middle 3 3 5
middle: 3
$ ./middle 2 1 3
middle: 1
$ 1s
middle middle.bb middle.bbg middle.c middle.da
$_
```







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Obtaining Coverage

gcov maps the recorded coverage to source code:

```
$ gcov middle.c
```

76.19% of 21 source lines executed in file middle.c Creating middle.c.gcov. \$

That's not enough coverage yet—let's see if we can improve:

```
$ ./middle 3 2 1
middle: 2
$ gcov middle.c
85.71% of 21 source lines executed in file middle.c
Creating middle.c.gcov.
$
```




The middle.c.gcov file


	<pre>int middle(int x, int y, int z)</pre>								
3									
	int m = z;								
3	if (y < z)								
2	if (x < y)								
######	m = y;								
2	else if (x < z)								
2 $m = y;$									
2	else								
1	if $(x > y)$								
1	m = y;								
######	else if $(x > z)$								
######	m = x;								
3									
3	return m;								
3									

######: Code that was not executed so far



Coverage Anomaly









Discrete Visualization

Basic idea: differentiate

• Code executed only in failing runs

 \Rightarrow "Code that is highly suspect"

- Code executed in passing and failing runs
 - ⇒ "Code that is ambiguous"
- Code executed only in passing runs
 - \Rightarrow "Code that is probably correct"






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Discrete Visualization (2)



Continuous Visualization

Have *hue* express *percentage* of failed statements:

- 100% test cases executing this statement failed
- 66% test cases executing this statement failed
- 50% test cases executing this statement failed
- 0% test cases executing this statement failed

Have *brightness* express *percentage* of test cases:


- executed in 100% of all test cases
- executed in 66% of all test cases
- executed in 33% of all test cases







Continuous Visualization (2)



The Tarantula Bug Finder

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<pre>*pqdim_unit_ptr = 0;</pre>									
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
Significance of Coverage Anomaly

How well can comparing coverage detect anomalies?

False negatives. "How red are the defective statements?"False positives. "How red are non-defective statements?"

Subject program: Space

- 8000 lines of executable code
- 1000 coverage-based test suites w/ 156-4700 test cases
- 20 defective versions w/ one defect each (corrected in subsequent version)




How red are the defective statements?

Almost all defective statements were correctly flagged as red.

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How red are non-defective statements?



Up to 10% of non-defective statements (\approx 800 statements) were incorrectly flagged as red.

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Open Questions

- What is "the defective statement"? (The one that is to be changed?)
- What does it mean if a non-defective statement is red?
- What does it mean if a defective statement is not red?
- How many test runs are required?
- Can we generate extra test runs by experimentation?





Interaction with cause-effect chains

How can we integrate anomaly detection into isolation of origins and cause-effect chains?

Possible approach:

- Start with anomalies (i.e. red statements)
- Isolate origin of the statement being executed (i.e. the *if*-condition that is once false and once true)
- Test whether an alternate condition would have altered the outcome
- If outcome is altered, isolate the cause-effect chain of this condition, focusing on earlier anomalies

Open research (hint, hint)!



Concepts

- Comparing the coverage of passing and failing test cases can lead to statements likely to induce a failure.
- Technique is easy to use; results are easy to interpret
- Approach is based on *heuristics* ("likely to induce a failure")
- Code that is *always executed* cannot be isolated (say, the sample defect)
- Approach depends on availability of large test suites



References

- gcov—a test coverage program, in: Using the GNU Compiler, http://gcc.gnu.org/onlinedocs/gcc/
- Tarantula: Fault Localization via Visualization, http://www.cc.gatech.edu/aristotle/Tools/ tarantula/publications.html